January 2021 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 249834 - DOMINIC MELECIO M. TOLEDO, WILFREDO J. AGCAOILI, FERDINAND H. MUNSAYAC, TEDDY J. SEBASTIAN, MARIE TESS B. GASPAR, JAMES S. GALANG, CHRISTIAN J. ADINA, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CESARIO D. GABRIEL AND ARNOLD B. BARENG, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 249834, January 19, 2021
DOMINIC MELECIO M. TOLEDO, WILFREDO J. AGCAOILI, FERDINAND H. MUNSAYAC, TEDDY J. SEBASTIAN, MARIE TESS B. GASPAR, JAMES S. GALANG, CHRISTIAN J. ADINA, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CESARIO D. GABRIEL AND ARNOLD B. BARENG, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse the Resolution2 dated February 22, 2019 and the Resolution3 dated October 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 1 55974 dismissing the petition for certiorari4 filed by petitioners. The petition for certiorari assailed the Decision5 dated May 10, 2016 and Order6 dated February 19, 2018 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-15-0268 finding the petitioners administratively liable for Grave Misconduct for falsifying Barangay Resolution No. 10, series of 2014 (Resolution No. 10) of Barangay Suyo (30-A), Laoag City and ordering their dismissal from public service with accessory penalties.7
Antecedents
Ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner's Arguments
Respondent's Arguments
Issues
Ruling of the Court
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.48Similar to Tanenglian, petitioners herein availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 to assail the decision of the Ombudsman, a quasi-judicial body, in their administrative case. They also filed their petition beyond the period of appeal under Rule 43. Akin to the Court's ruling in Tanenglian, We find that interest of justice will be better served if the petition will be given due course rather than deny it on procedural grounds particularly because the issues raised by the petitioners are important and deserve consideration. Further, petitioners have been imposed the penalty of dismissal from office with perpetual disqualification to run for public office and to take civil service examination. Time and again, this Court has exercised its power to suspend or relax the rules of procedure upon finding that its rigid application will result in obstruction rather than promotion of the interests of justice.49 However, this power of the Court can only be resorted to in exceptional cases such as when the decision rendered was "legally erroneous," "patently unjust," or "potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties." We rule that the Decision of the Ombudsman is patently unjust and caused unwarranted and irremediable injury to petitioners since they have not just been dismissed from office but also barred from seeking any public office or taking the civil service examination despite their innocence. In this case, the Ombudsman in its Decision dated May 10, 2016 found petitioners administratively liable for grave misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal from service with accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examination. Petitioners contend that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding them administratively liable for grave misconduct.50 Upon judicious review of the records of the case, there is basis to overturn the findings of the Ombudsman and absolve the petitioners of their administrative liability. The basis for the complaint for grave misconduct against petitioners is the alleged falsification of Resolution No. 10. The Ombudsman relied on the sworn testimony of Bareng that the council did not deliberate on the revocation of Sections 21 and 26 of the Suyo Revenue Code and that he did not vote on the passage of Resolution No. 10. However, upon review of the minutes of the other sessions of the council, the members discussed the revocation of the collection of quarry fees, to wit:
October 5, 2014 First Session x x x x Agcaoili: The Suyo Lake is a public land. That's what we learned from the DENR when asked about it. Bareng: To be amended. Captain: To be resolved and it will be specified what will be amended including the quarrying. Galang: When asked before if we are allowed to ask payment in the quarrying they said no. Bareng: It could be because they cannot blame us we do not know. We will follow what they told us, Agcaoili: What shall we do then? Galang: Revoke the quarrying. Agcaoili: There should really be a resolution. Galang: Working is not allowed without certification. Agcaoili: Of course, it is not allowed without certification. Captain: Who then? You, apo James being the one in charge in the appropriation, you will be the one to go and tell to Jeff Farinas about our request. x x x x51As a matter of fact, in the Order dated August 24, 2018 of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17756-16, the RTC ruled that Resolution No. 10 was not falsified as evidenced by the afore-quoted portion of the minutes of the session held on October 5, 2014. There was actual deliberation on the revocation of collection of quarry fees and Bareng actively participated therein. Further, RTC concluded that it was the intention of the council to pass a resolution revoking the collection of quarry fees. We quote in part the findings of the RTC, to wit:
The prosecution's assertion that the assailed Barangay Resolution could not have been passed owing to the absence of deliberation of its passage reflected on the minutes of the meeting is of no moment to belie its adoption. To reiterate, Arnold Bareng categorically admitted that the assailed Resolution No. 10 Series of 2014 was passed and that the voting profile for its approval is reflected on the "ayes" and "nays" reflected on the resolution itself. Furthermore, prosecution witness ARNOLD BARENG cannot be permitted to feign his ignorance and his participation on the passage of the assailed Barangay Resolution considering his categorical declarations that he participated in the deliberations of the amendments of the quarry fee during the regular sessions on 17 August 2014, 21 September 2014 and 05 October 2014, of which he himself agreed to the proposed amendments, (tsn Arnold Bareng, October 3, 2017 pp 20-21) It should be emphasized that ARNOLD BARENG explained that the Barangay Secretary drafts the resolution on the basis of the minutes of the previous regular session approving the same, in which case the minutes referred to prior to the 16 November 2014 regular session is the session on October 5, 2014, where ARNOLD BARENG agreed to the amendment.52Thus, even if the revocation was not included in the list of Agenda in the minutes of the November 16 session, such fact will not make Resolution No. 10 a falsified public document.53 RTC dismissed the falsification case against the petitioners for lack of sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners submitted before the Ombudsman and the CA the TSN of the testimony of Arnold Bareng in Criminal Case No. 17756-16 and the Order of the RTC dismissing the falsification case against them to support their claim that Resolution No. 10 was not falsified. Likewise, the minutes of the council sessions on September 21, October 5, and November 16, 2014 were submitted to the Ombudsman as proof that deliberations were made on the revocation of Sections 21 and 26 of the Suyo Revenue Code. Despite all these substantial evidence to support their case, the Ombudsman ruled against petitioners and held them administratively liable for grave misconduct. We hold that the Ombudsman erred in not considering the totality of evidence submitted by the parties and in focusing solely on the evidence of private respondents Gabriel and Bareng to support its decision. To be held liable for an administrative charge, substantial evidence must be proven or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. To the mind of the Ombudsman, the sworn testimony of Bareng and the minutes of the November 16, 2014 session were sufficient to find petitioners administratively liable for grave misconduct in falsifying a public document. However, the Ombudsman failed to consider other evidence submitted by the petitioners to support their claim that Resolution No. 10 was not a falsified public document. As admitted by Bareng in Criminal Case No. 17756-16, the council deliberated the revocation of collection of quarry fees during one of its sessions. Further, he admitted that an ordinance or resolution of the barangay can be passed in two methods: (1) the votes cast will be reflected in the minutes, signed by the participating members and the Secretary will prepare the ordinance or resolution based from those votes; or (2) the votes cast will be reflected in the ordinance or resolution itself showing the ayes/nays and the Secretary will prepare the draft and the Chairman will certify it. Any of these two methods is a valid way of enacting an ordinance or resolution. As shown in Resolution No. 10, petitioners adopted the second method and reflected their votes in the resolution itself as prepared by Secretary Adina and certified by Chairman Toledo. Under the Revised Penal Code, acts of falsification by a public officer include the following:
- Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
- Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
- Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
- Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
- Altering true dates;
- Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
- Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
- Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.54
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trilling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.55There was no falsification of public document. There was no wrongful intent on the part of the petitioners in enacting Resolution No. 10 as they did so only to address the public clamor against the imposition of quarry fees and fees on fishing gadgets. Furthermore, they were informed that the barangay does not have the authority to impose quarry fees as that power is lodged with the provincial government in accordance with the Local Government Code. As stated by the petitioners, they were merely following the law. All told, the petitioners were merely performing their duties in accordance with law when they passed Resolution No. 10. Thus, they must not be administratively disciplined for grave misconduct which requires a finding that there was wrongful intent to violate the law or failure to discharge their duties, and there was none in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 10, 2016 and the Order dated February 19, 2018 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-15-0268 finding petitioners Dominic Melecio M. Toledo, Wilfredo J. Agcaoili, Ferdinand H. Munsayac, Teddy J. Sebastian, Jefferson R. Palting, Marie Tess B. Gaspar, James S. Galang, and Christian J. Adina administratively liable for Grave Misconduct are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for Grave Misconduct against petitioners is DISMISSED
SO ORDERED. Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 10-33.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongnon and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi; id. at 36-39.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Ramon A. Cruz; id. at 47-49
4 Id. at 135-146.
5 Id. at 71-77.
6 Id. at 123-128.
7 Id. at 135-136.
8 Records, p. 18.
9 Id. at 21.
10 Id. at 18-19.
11 Docketed as I-15-INV-15D-00091
12Rollo, pp. 172-173.
13 Records, pp. 77-79.
14 Id. at 86.
15 Id. at 95-98.
16Rollo, pp. 74-75.
17 Id. at 73-74.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 82.
20 Id. at 83.
21 Id. at 84.
22 Id. at 85.
23 Id. at 84-85.
24 Id. at 92-95.
25 Id. at 97-122.
26 Id. at 93.
27 Id. at 94.
28 Id. at 127.
29 Id. at 135-142.
30 Supra note 2.
31Rollo, pp. 36-37.
32 Id. at 38.
33 Id. at 40-46.
34 Id. at 41-42.
35 Id. at 43-45.
36 Id.
37 Supra note 3.
38Rollo, p. 49.
39 Id. at 10-33.
40 Id. at 196.
41 Id. at 19-22.
42 Id. at 26-29.
43 Id. at 58-59.
44 Id. at 177-183.
45 Id. at 59, 181-182.
46Department of Education v. Cuanan, 594 Phil. 451, 460 (2008).
47 573 Phil. 472 (2008).
48 Id. at 489.
49AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino, 568 Phil. 465 (2008); Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 521 Phil. 224 (2006); Chua v. Santos, 483 Phil. 392 (2004); Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation, 425 Phil. 961 (2002).
50Rollo, pp. 74-75.
51 Records, pp. 415-416.
52 CA rollo, p. 111
53 Id. at 113.
54 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 171.
55Commission on Elections v. Mamalinta, 807 Phil. 304, 311 (2017), citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Viesca, 758 Phil. 16 (2015).cj