Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2021 > June 2021 Decisions > A.M. No. P-21-024 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 18-4815-P] - HON. MARLO C. BRASALES, Complainant, v. MAXIMA Z. BORJA, CLERK OF COURT IV, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC), KORONADAL CITY, SOUTH COTABATO, Respondent. :

The Court once again exercises its exclusive power of discipline and supervision over all court personnel.

ANTECEDENTS
The instant case stemmed from a Memorandum¹ dated May 2, 2017, issued by Judge Marlo C. Brasales (Judge Brasales), Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Koronadal City, South Cotabato. The Memorandum charged Maxima Z. Borja (Maxima), Clerk of Court IV of the same court, with Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance for approving without authority the leave of absence applications of Court Stenographer II Rachel N. Dadivas (Rachel).

On April 7, 2017, Rachel noticed that her two (2) leave applications dated March 24, 2017 and March 27, 2017 were not signed by Judge Brasales.² Thus, in order to remedy the situation and not be the reason for the possible delay in the release of the salaries of all office staff, Rachel asked Maxima to sign another set of leave applications for the month of March 2017, which the latter acceded.³

On May 2, 2017, Judge Brasales issued a Memorandum⁴ directing Maxima to explain why she should not be administratively charged with Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance for signing Rachel's leave applications without his authority to do so. Maxima allegedly defied Judge Brasales' verbal instruction and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 08-2017, dated February 2, 2017, requiring that applications for leave of absence of lower court personnel should bear the recommendation for approval or disapproval of the Presiding Judge, or the Clerk of Court. as delegated by the Presiding Judge, in writing. On April 17, 2017, Judge Brasales indorsed the "Memorandum and Explanation of Ms. Maxima Z. Borja" to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.⁵

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its 1^st Indorsement⁶ dated July 31, 2017, the OCA directed Maxima to submit her comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

In her comment,⁷ Maxima asked for understanding and humanitarian consideration of the Court, citing the many tasks she has to perform as the Clerk of Court of single-sala station, causing her to be forgetful at times of the limits of her authority. She claimed that she received a copy of A.C. No. 08-2017 on March 8, 2017, but she might have overlooked the circular and had not fully grasped the implication of the new guidelines, and the changes in the approval of applications for leave of absence when she signed Rachel's leave applications. Maxima avowed that her act of signing the applications for leave was a mere error of judgment without any intention of violating the law. She reiterated the contents of her letter⁸ dated May 4, 2017, submitted to Judge Brasales, and highlighted that she first refused to sign the applications for leave but then acceded to the request after Rachel explained that unapproved applications for leave would delay the payment of their salaries as daily time records will not be submitted to the Court.⁹

On June 23, 2020, the OCA submitted to the Court its recommendation, thus:¹⁰cj

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of this Honorable Court that:clubjuris

1. the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
   
   
2. respondent Clerk of Court IV Maxima Z. Borja be found GUILTY of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and be SUSPENDED from the service for THIRTY (30) DAYS, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.¹¹ (Emphases in the original.)

The OCA found that Maxima knew that she was not authorized to sign the applications for leave since she ordered someone to bring them to Judge Brasales for signature, that initially, she refused to sign. Her fear of delay in the release of salaries did not justify her act of signing because Norala, South Cotabato is only an hour away from Maxima's station; thus, it was not difficult for her to send the applications for leave to Judge Brasales for signature. However, the OCA found no deliberate intent for Maxima to overstep her authority, and to defy Judge Brasales in accommodating Rachel. The act was a mere lapse in judgment about the appropriate action she should have taken when she discovered that the applications for leave were left unsigned by Judge Brasales. The OCA concluded that Maxima violated reasonable office rules and regulations classified under Section 50 (F) (3), Rule 10 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS)¹² as a light offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one (1) day to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from service for the third offense.¹³ In light of Maxima's previous offense of Simple Neglect of Duty in In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit in MTC in Cities, Koronadal City,¹⁴ where she was fined P5,000.00, and directed to adopt a more efficient system of collecting docket fees and of taking care of court exhibits, the OCA found the penalty of suspension for thirty (30) days, justified.

RULING
The Court adopts the OCA's finding of guilt, but modifies the recommended penalty.
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Maxima is guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

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A.C. No. 08-2017 is explicit that the clerk of court may approve applications for leave of absence of lower court personnel only with prior written authorization from the presiding judge. It is undisputed that Judge Brasales did not authorize Maxima to approve Rachel's leave applications. Yet, Maxima signed the two (2) leave applications, and attempted to excuse herself by blaming her duties as clerk of court, and her belated receipt of a copy of A.C. No. 08-2017.¹⁵ Although Maxima only acted upon Rachel's plea for her to sign the subject applications so that their salaries will not be withheld, we cannot turn a blind eye on Maxima's infraction. We observe that the provision of A.C. No. 08-2017 on the approval process was lifted verbatim from Item IV of A.C. No. 08-2009¹⁶ dated February 3, 2009 of this Court. Thus, even before receiving a copy of A.C. No. 08-2017, Maxima is expected to know that she cannot approve or disapprove applications for leave of absence without a written delegation from Judge Brasales. We have repeatedly held that unawareness of a circular is not an excuse for non�compliance.¹⁷ Besides, a clerk of court is regarded as a role model for all court employees under her supervision,¹⁸ and must, at all times, be accountable to the public for all her actions. Any conduct, act, or omission that violates the norm of public accountability, or diminishes, or tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary will not be tolerated, condoned, or countenanced.¹⁹ The OCA correctly found Maxima guilty of violating reasonable office rules and regulations, more specifically A.C. No. 08-2017.

We shall now discuss the applicable law in meting out the penalty on Maxima - a court personnel.

Penalty.

The Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.²⁰ Jurisprudence has characterized this authority as exclusive; only the Supreme Court can oversee the court employees' compliance with all laws, rules and regulations.²¹ Moreover, only the Supreme Court can set the parameters concerning their discipline.²² On this premise, the Court issued two sets of rules to govern judicial discipline cases, namely: (a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (Rules),²³ to apply to judges and justices of lower courts; and (b) the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (CCCP),²⁴ "to apply to all judiciary personnel 'who are not justices or judge.'"²⁵ The Court explained the application of the rules in Investment Corporation v. Gonzales (Boston Finance),²⁶ as follows:cj

In its present form, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court is entitled "Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan." As its titular heading denotes, Rule 140 was crafted to specifically govern the discipline of judges and justices of the lower courts, providing therein not only a distinct classification of charges but also the applicable sanctions. A perusal of the offenses listed therein shows that they are broad enough to cover all kinds of administrative charges related to judicial functions, as they even include violations of the codes of conduct for judges, as well as of Supreme Court directives. It is likewise apparent that the list of offenses therein includes even violations of the civil service rules, such as acts of dishonesty, gambling in public, and engaging in partisan political activities. The Court therefore holds that violations of civil service laws and rules are subsumed under the charges enumerated in Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. x x x:

x x x

Hence, in resolving administrative cases against judges or justices of the lower courts, reference need only be made to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as regards the charges, as well as the imposable penalties. If the respondent judge or justice is found liable for two (2) or more charges, separate penalties shall be imposed on him/her such that Section 50 of the RRACCS shall have no application in imposing sanctions.

On the other hand, as regards other court personnel who are not judges or justices, the CCCP governs the Court's exercise of disciplinary authority over them. It must be pointed out that the CCCP explicitly incorporates civil service rules, x x x:

x x x

Hence, offenses under civil service laws and rules committed by court personnel constitute violations of the CCCP, for which the offender will be held administratively liable. However, considering that the CCCP does not specify the sanctions for those violations, the Court has, in the exercise of its discretion, adopted the penalty provisions under existing civil service rules, such as the RRACCS, including Section 50 thereof.²⁷ (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)

The Court, nonetheless, pointed out that the guidelines x x x are based on the prevailing legal framework in judicial discipline cases, which the Court may, in its discretion, eventually revise through a proper administrative issuance. After all, the power of supervision over all judiciary personnel is exclusively vested in the Court.²⁸

On October 2, 2018 the Court en banc issued A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC²⁹ which approved the creation of the Judicial Integrity Board and the Corruption Prevention and Investigation Office. The Court also approved the amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules which expanded the coverage to include personnel of the lower courts. The Court further amended Rule 140 on July 7, 2020, and clarified that the rule shall cover discipline of personnel of the judiciary, thus:cj

RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR, SPECIAL OR SHARI' AH COURTS, PRESIDING JUSTICES AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SANDGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND SHARI' AH HIGH COURT, COURT ADMINISTRATOR, DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATORS AND ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATORS, AND PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARY

SEC. 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of the Presiding Justices and Associate Justices the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Shari' ah High Court and Judges of lower courts, including the Shari' ah District or Circuit Courts, and the officials and employees of the Judiciary, Court Administrator, Deputy Court Administrators, Assistant Court Administrators and their personnel, may be instituted motu proprio, by the Supreme Court, in the Judicial Integrity Board.³⁰ (Emphases supplied)

Accordingly, we will apply Rule 140 of the Rules in disciplining court personnel who are not judges or justices since it is the prevailing legal framework. The exception is when its application will be prejudicial, or will work injustice to the court employee, i.e., the gravity of the offense will be increased, or a higher penalty for violation will be imposed.³¹ In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply.³² This is in line with the judicial policy patterned after criminal law that penal laws shall have retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.³³

Maxima is the Clerk of Court of the MTCC Koronadal City, South Cotabato, who violated A.C. No. 08-2017 on April 7, 2017. Since the incident happened before the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules by A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC dated October 2, 2018, Rule 140 will not apply to Maxima if its application will work injustice, or will be prejudicial to her. Instead, the penalty provisions in the Revised RACCS (2011 RRACCS),³⁴ the civil service rules in place at the time of commission of the offense of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations on April 7, 2017,³⁵ will apply.

We find the retroactive application of Rule 140 of the Rules, prejudicial to Maxima.

Section 46 (F) (3) of the 2011 RRACCS categorizes violation of reasonable office rules and regulations as a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one (1) day to thirty (30) days for the second offense, and dismissal from service for the third offense.³⁶ On the other hand, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars is a less serious charge under Section 23,³⁷ Rule 140 of the Rules, as amended and modified by A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC dated October 2, 2018, is punishable by any of the following: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of not [less] than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.³⁸ It is dear that Rule 140 is not favorable to Maxima; hence, the 2011 RRACCS will apply.

As to the penalty, applying the framework of the rules on the application of penalties under the 2011 RRACCS, Maxima's previous violation of Simple Neglect of Duty in In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit in MTC in Cities, Koronadal City;³⁹ for which she was penalized with a fine of P5,000.00 will not be counted as a "first offense" that will elevate the penalty of her present infraction of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations to the prescribed penalty for the "second offense." The previous and present infractions are not similar in nature or classification in terms of gravity, i.e., grave, less grave, and light.⁴⁰ Also, the earlier infraction cannot aggravate the penalty for the current infraction because the two (2) infractions are differently classified.⁴¹ Thus, the prescribed penalty for Maxima's violation of A.C. No. 08-2017 is a reprimand. Considering that reprimand is a straight penalty, any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission is of no moment.

FOR THESE REASONS, the complaint is RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter. Maxima Z. Borja is GUILTY of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations under Section 46 (F) (3) of the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. She is hereby REPRIMANDED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.cj

SO ORDERED.
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Perlas-Bernabe, (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, Rosario, and J. Lopez,^*JJ., concur.cj

Endnotes:

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^* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822, dated April 7, 2021.

¹Rollo, p. 6.

² Id. at 50.

³ Id. at 65-66.

⁴ Id. at 6.

⁵ Id. at 9-10.

⁶ Id. at 21.

⁷ Id. at 55-59.

⁸ Id. at 30.

⁹ Id. at 65-66.

¹⁰ Id. at 65-67.

¹¹ Id. at 67.

¹² Resolution No. 1701077, July 3, 2017.

¹³Rollo, p. 66.

¹⁴ 496 Phil. 814 (2005).

¹⁵Rollo, pp. 27-28.

¹⁶ Entitled 'Guidelines in Case of Prolonged Absences, Tardiness and Undertime, Filing of Applications for Leave and Availment of Rehabilitation Privelege' dated February 3, 2009.

¹⁷Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) - OCA v. Calacal, 619 Phil. 1, 3 (2009). See also Noynay-Arlos v. Conag, 465 Phil. 849, 858 (2004); Financial Audit of Books of Accounts of OIC Deseo, 392 Phil. 122, 128 (2000); Report on the Financial Audit in RTC, General Santos City, 338 Phil. 13, 22-23 (1997).

¹⁸Concerned Employees of the MTC of Maycauayan Bulacan v. Paguio-Bacani, 611 Phil. 630, 641 (2009).

¹⁹Contreras v. Monge, 617 Phil. 30, 36 (2009).

²⁰ 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 6.

SEC. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

²¹ See Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Assoc. of the SC, 692 Phil. 117, 158 (2012). See Also Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, 585 Phil. 289, 300 (2008).

²²Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4296-RTJ), October 9, 2018.

²³ Amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC entitled "DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN," dated September 11, 2001.

²⁴ A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC dated April 23, 2004.

²⁵ See supra note 21.

²⁶ Id.

²⁷ Supra.

²⁸ Id., emphasis and underscoring supplied.

²⁹ Took effect on December 4, 2018, or 20 days from its publication in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on November 14, 2018.

³⁰ Amendments to Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

³¹ See Dela Rama v. De Leon, A.M. No. P-14-3240, March 2, 2021.

³² See id.

³³ See REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 22, cited in Dela Rama v. De Leon, id.

³⁴ CSC Resolution No. 1101502 dated November 8, 2011.

³⁵ While the 2017 RACCS took effect on August 17, 2017. Section 125 provides that it shall take effect fifteen days from the date of publication in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation; (the 2017 RACCS was published in The Philippine Star on August 2, 2017), Section 124 provides that "[t]he provisions of the existing RRACCS [i.e., 2011 RRACCS] shall continue to be applied to all pending cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of [the 2017 RACCS], provided it will not unduly prejudice substantive rights." Judge Brasales indorsed the Memorandum dated May 2, 2017, to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action on May 4, 2017, see rollo, p. 2.

³⁶ SEC. 46. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

x x x

F. The following offenses are punishable by reprimand for the first offense suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense; and dissmissal from the service for the third offense.

x x x

3. Violation of reasonable of the rules and regulations[.]

³⁷ SEC. 23. Less Serious Charge. Less serious charge include:

x x x

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars[.]

³⁸ A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC (Resolution), October 2, 2018, Section 25 (B). Under A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC, entitled "Amendments to the Fines Provided in Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court," dated March 1 6, 2021, the fine is now P35,000.00 but not exceeding P100,000.00.

³⁹Supra note 14.

⁴⁰ See Court of Appeals by: COC Marigamen v. Manabat, Jr., 676 Phil. 157, 162 (2011) See also Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Mazo, Pedrosa and Dayap, 563 Phil. 465, 469 (2017).

⁴¹ Cf. Espinosa v. Balisnomo, A.M. No. P-20-4039, February 26, 2020, and Pulgar v. Resurreccion, 745 Phil. 693 (2014). In Espinosa the respondent clerk of court was previously found guilty of simple misconduct which is a less grave offense. Then, the respondent concurred insubordination which is also a less grave offense. Both offenses were penalized under the same provisions of the civil service rules. Yet, the Court imposed only the maximum period of the prescribed penalty for the first offense for insubordination or suspension for six months without pay. In Pulgar the respondent stenographer was previously found guilty of simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense, and was fined given that it was her first offense. Thereafter the Court held the respondent liable for simple dishonesty, also a less grave offense but penalized under a different provision in the civil service rules. The Court ruled that the "previous case is not a factor [in determining the penalty for the person offense] because of the dissimilarity of the offenses." Thus, the Court imposed upon the respondent the maximum period of the prescribed penalty for simple dishonesty committed for the first time, or suspension for six months without pay. In these cases, the Court considered the previous infractions as aggravating circumstances in imposing the penalty for the subsequent offenses because the previous infractions and subsequent offenses were of similar classification based on gravity (Id. at 710-711.)cj